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Investor Recognition and Stock Returns 
Abstract 
We analyze the relation between investor recognition and stock returns.  
Consistent with Merton’s (1987) theoretical analysis, we show that (i) 
contemporaneous stock returns are positively related to changes in investor 
recognition, (ii) future stock returns are negatively related to changes in investor 
recognition, (iii) the above relations are stronger for stocks with greater 
idiosyncratic risk and (iv) corporate investment and financing activities are both 
positively related to changes in investor recognition.  Our results demonstrate that 







We conduct an empirical analysis of the predictions of Merton’s (1987) model of 
capital market equilibrium under incomplete information.  The key behavioral 
assumption invoked in Merton’s (1987) model is that investors only use securities that 
they know about in constructing their optimal portfolios.  Merton demonstrates that 
variation in the resulting degree of ‘investor recognition’ of a security influences the 
security’s equilibrium pricing.  The key predictions of the model are (i) security value is 
increasing in investor recognition, (ii) expected return is decreasing in investor 
recognition, (iii) the above two relations are increasing in the security’s idiosyncratic risk, 
and (iv) financing and investing activities in the underlying firm are increasing in 
investor recognition.  Our empirical results are uniformly consistent with these 
predictions and are both economically and statistically significant. 
Our results make several contributions to existing research.  First, we show that 
changes in investor recognition are an important determinant of contemporaneous stock 
returns.  Our results indicate that changes in investor recognition are even more important 
than news about fundamentals such as earnings in explaining contemporaneous stock 
returns.  These results help to explain why previous research has found that news about 
fundamentals explains a relatively small proportion of the variation in stock returns (e.g., 
Roll, 1988; Lev, 1989).   
Second, we reconcile conflicting evidence from previous research regarding the 
relation between investor recognition and future stock returns.  Early research by Arbel, 
Carvell and Strebel (1983) finds evidence of the predicted negative relation.  More recent 
research by Chen, Hong and Stein (2002) provides contradictory evidence of a positive 
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relation between changes in investor recognition and future returns.  We document that 
changes in investor recognition are positively autocorrelated over short horizons.  We 
further show that Chen et al.’s evidence of a positive relation between changes in investor 
recognition and future stock returns is attributable to this positive autocorrelation 
combined with the positive relation between changes in investor recognition and 
contemporaneous stock returns.  After controlling for autocorrelation in changes in 
investor recognition, we find that changes in investor recognition have the predicted 
negative relation with future stock returns. 
Third, our results suggest that investor recognition is an important determinant of 
corporate financial policy.  We find that changes in investor recognition are strongly 
related to contemporaneous and future corporate financing and investing activities.  This 
evidence corroborates Brennan and Tamorowski’s (2000) conclusions regarding the role 
of corporate investor relations activities as a tool for lowering the cost of capital in firms 
that are raising capital. 
Finally, our results suggest that investor recognition may help explain a number of 
‘anomalies’ in stock returns.  Prior research shows that corporate financing and investing 
activities are negatively related to future stock returns [see Ritter (2003) and Titman, Wei 
and Xie (2004)] and that short-horizon stock returns exhibit positive ‘momentum’ 
[Jegadeesh and Titman (1993)].  Investor recognition is related to each of these variables 
in such a way that their relations with future returns can be explained by the investor 
recognition hypothesis. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows.  Section 2 provides a more 
detailed description of the investor recognition hypothesis and develops our empirical 
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predictions.  Section 3 describes our data, section 4 presents our results and section 5 
concludes. 
 
2. Hypothesis Development 
The idea that neglected stocks earn a return premium over recognized stocks has 
been in existence for many years (e.g., Arbel, Carvell and Strebel, 1983).  Merton (1987) 
develops an asset pricing model that explains this apparent pricing anomaly.  The key 
difference between Merton’s model and standard asset pricing models such as the CAPM 
is that Merton’s model assumes that investors only know about a subset of the available 
securities, and that these subsets differ across investors.  This assumption means that 
some stocks are known to relatively few investors.  Investors in these ‘neglected’ 
securities must therefore hold undiversified portfolios and so require a return premium 
for bearing idiosyncratic risk.  The key implications of the model are that (i) the value of 
a security is increasing in the number of investors who know about the security, and (ii) 
the expected return on a security is decreasing in the number of investors who know 
about the security; and (iii) the above two relations are stronger for securities with greater 
idiosyncratic risk.  Merton refers to his model as a model of capital market equilibrium 
with incomplete information.  Subsequent research generally refers to the model and its 
implications as the ‘investor recognition hypothesis’. 
Merton (1987) also provides an extension of his basic model that examines the 
impact of endogenizing the choice of investor recognition on a firm’s investment and 
financing decisions.  This extension indicates that changes in investor recognition will be 
positively correlated with corporate financing and investing activities.  If exogenous 
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events cause investor recognition of a firm’s securities to increase, then the firm’s cost of 
capital will fall and so its optimal level of financing and investing activities will increase.  
If exogenous events cause an increase in financing and investing activities, then the 
benefits from having a lower cost of capital will increase, so efforts to generate investor 
recognition of the firm’s securities will increase. 
Our empirical examination of the investor recognition hypothesis focuses on testing 
all four of the predictions identified above: 
 
P1: Security value is increasing in investor recognition. 
 
P2: Expected return is decreasing in investor recognition. 
 
P3:  The above two relations are stronger for securities with greater idiosyncratic risk. 
 
P4: Financing and investing are increasing in investor recognition. 
 
A number of previous studies provide empirical tests of subsets of these 
predictions.  One line of research focuses on P1 by examining the impact of events that 
increase investor recognition on firm value.  Events studied include exchange listings 
(Kadlec and McConnell, 1994 and Foerster and Karolyi, 1999), initiation of analyst 
coverage (Irvine, 2003), addition to stock indices (Shleifer, 1986; Chen, Noronha and 
Singal, 2004) and periods of unusual trading volume (Gervais, Kaniel and Mingelgrin, 
2001; Kaniel, Li and Starks, 2003).  These studies generally find that events increasing 
investor recognition lead to increases in security value.  We contribute to this literature 
by documenting how a comprehensive measure of investor recognition can be applied to 
all securities in all periods.  This comprehensive measure allows for an overall 
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assessment of the importance of investor recognition in explaining the variability of 
security returns. 
A second line of research focuses on P2 by examining the association between 
changes in investor recognition and future stock returns.  The evidence from this research 
is mixed.  Early research by Arbel, Carvell and Strebel (1983) uses the number of 
institutional investors as a measure of investor recognition and finds evidence of the 
hypothesized negative relation between investor recognition and future stock returns.  
More recently, Chen, Hong and Stein (2002) find evidence of a positive relation between 
the change in the number of institutional holders and future stock returns.  This finding is 
inconsistent with the negative relation predicted by the investor recognition hypothesis.  
Using a similar methodology to Chen, et al., Bodnaruk and Ostberg (2005) find evidence 
of the hypothesized negative relation using a sample of Swedish stocks.  We contribute to 
this literature by reconciling the inconsistent evidence in Chen et al. with the investor 
recognition hypothesis.  We show that changes in investor recognition are positively 
autocorrelated.  Since P1 predicts that changes in investor recognition are positively 
correlated with contemporaneous returns, it is important to control for this autocorrelation 
when evaluating the relation between changes in investor recognition and future stock 
returns.  After controlling for autocorrelation, we find that changes in investor 
recognition are negatively related to future stock returns, as predicted by P2. 
A third line of research focuses on the relation between idiosyncratic risk and future 
stock returns and is indirectly related to P3.  This research focuses on estimating the 
unconditional association between idiosyncratic risk and future stock returns.  The 
intuition behind this research is that since many investors hold undiversified portfolios, 
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idiosyncratic risk should be priced.  Results of this research are mixed.  An early and 
influential study by Fama and MacBeth (1973) finds no role for idiosyncratic risk in 
explaining future stock returns.  However, a more recent study by Malkiel and Xu (2004) 
finds evidence of the predicted positive relation between idiosyncratic risk and future 
stock returns.  We contribute to this literature by providing more powerful tests of the 
hypothesized relation between idiosyncratic risk and stock returns.  Intuitively, our P3 
examines whether idiosyncratic risk is more strongly positively related to future stock 
returns in stocks that are held by relatively undiversified investors (i.e., in stocks with 
low investor recognition).  Our results are strongly consistent with P3 and corroborate 
and extend the findings in Malkiel and Xu (2004). 
Finally, to our knowledge there is no research that directly examines our P4.  There 
are, however, numerous studies that examine the relation between corporate activities and 
future stock returns.  Ritter (2003) summarizes the findings or a large body of evidence 
identifying a negative relation between corporate financing activities and future stock 
returns.  Titman, Wei and Xie (2004) document a negative relation between capital 
expenditures and future stock returns.  Our predictions P4 and P2 combine to suggest that 
the investor recognition hypothesis may provide an explanation for the negative stock 
returns following these corporate financing and investing activities.  P4 predicts that 
investor recognition is positively related to corporate financing and investing activities.  
P2 predicts that investor recognition is negatively related to stock future returns.  These 
two predictions combine to generate the observed negative relation between corporate 
investing and financing activities and future stock returns. 
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3. Data and Variable Measurement 
Our tests require that we develop an empirical proxy for the investor recognition 
construct developed by Merton (1987).  Merton’s model consists of a large number of 
investors with identical initial wealths and he defines investor recognition of a security as 
the fraction of investors who know about the security.  There are several issues to 
consider in developing an empirical proxy for Merton’s construct.  First, we cannot 
directly observe how many investors ‘know about’ a particular security.  We can, 
however, observe the number of investors who are actually invested in a security.  It 
seems reasonable to argue that the number of investors who know about a security is 
increasing in the number of investors that own the security.  We therefore use ownership 
of a security as a proxy for knowledge of a security. 
A second issue arising in the construction of an empirical proxy for investor 
recognition is that Merton’s model assumes that all investors have identical initial 
wealths.  This assumption is almost certainly violated in practice.  Merton notes that 
extending his model to the more realistic case of a non-uniform distribution of initial 
wealth changes the appropriate investor recognition construct from the proportion of 
investors who know about the security to the fraction of total wealth owned by investors 
who know about the security.  It is difficult for us to measure the wealth levels of 
investors, but we can restrict our analysis to relatively wealthy investors.  We do so by 
limiting our measure of investor recognition to investors filing Form 13F with the SEC.  
13F filings are required on a quarterly basis from all institutional investors with more 
than $100 million of securities under their discretion.  We therefore use the proportion of 
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13F filers holding a long position in that security as our empirical proxy for investor 
recognition. 
A third issue that arises in measuring investor recognition is that Merton’s model 
predicts that firm value will be influenced by a host of other factors, including the 
magnitude of the firm’s future cash flows, the exposure of the security to common factors 
and the size of the firm.  Since we expect these other factors to be fairly constant over 
time, we conduct our empirical tests using a changes specification.  Testing our 
predictions in changes instead of levels should increase the power of our tests by 
reducing omitted variable problems related to these other factors.  Thus, our empirical 
tests employ the change in the proportion of 13-F filers holding a security as a proxy for 
the change in the investor recognition of that security.  This variable is identical to the 
measure employed by Chen et al. (2002) as a measure of differences in opinion.  
Following Chen et al., we refer to this variable as ∆BREADTH, denoting the change in 
the breadth of institutional ownership: 
1- tat time filers 13F ofnumber  Total
  1- tat time isecurity  holding filers 13F- tat time isecurity  holding filers 13FBREADTHit =∆
  
To capture the changes of ownership by existing filers (rather than changes in the 
population of 13F filers), we only include 13F filers who hold the stock in both period t 
and period t-1 (similar to Chen et al. 2002). 
A fourth issue with our measure of investor recognition is that it makes the 
assumption that investors only know about securities that they hold.  If an investor buys a 
security that they didn’t previously own, it seems reasonable to argue that they only just 
learned about that security.  But if an investor sells a security that they previously owned, 
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it is a stretch to argue that they forgot about that security. 1  Because the purchase of a 
security that was not previously owned is a cleaner measure of change in investor 
recognition, some of our tests decompose ∆BREADTH as ∆BREADTHt=INt-OUTt, 
where INt (OUTt) equals the fraction of 13F filers that have a zero (non-zero) holding of 
the stock at time t-1 and a non-zero (zero) holding in the stock at time t.  Similar 
measures are employed by Avner, Carvell and Strebel (1983) and Chen et al. (2002). 
Data used in our analyses are obtained from several resources. Data on the 13F 
filers is obtained from the CDA/Spectrum 13F institutional transaction quarterly data, 
covering the period from 1982 through 2004.  Stock return data are extracted from the 
CRSP monthly and daily return files, financial statement data are obtained from the 
COMPUSTAT quarterly files and analyst data is obtained from the I/B/E/S monthly 
summary files. 
Tests of P1 and P2 require a measure of stock returns.  We use size-adjusted 
returns, computed as the difference between the security’s return and the return on the 
security’s size-matched decile portfolio over the corresponding period.  Size-matched 
portfolios are based on decile assignments of market capitalization for all NYSE/AMEX 
stocks.  Tests of P3 require a measure of idiosyncratic security risk. We measure 
quarterly (annual) idiosyncratic risk as the square root of the sum over the prior 3 (12) 
months of monthly idiosyncratic risk measures. Following Brandt, Brav, and Graham 
(2005) and Campbell, Lettau, Malkiel, and Xu (2001), the monthly measures equal the 
                                                          
1 Note, however, that the investor does not have to actually forget about the security for Merton’s model to 
apply.  The investor simply has to exclude the security from the set of securities in their investable 
universe.  Institutional investors often restrict their investable universe using criteria such as market 
capitalization, index membership, exchange listing and liquidity.  Thus, a security could experience a 
reduction in investor recognition because it fails one or more of these criteria. 
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sum of daily squared excess returns. Excess returns are computed by subtracting the daily 
value-weighted industry return from the security’s daily return.  Industry classifications 
are based on Fama and French (1997). To facilitate interpretation of the results, our 
idiosyncratic risk measures are ranked into deciles and the ranks are normalized to range 
from -0.5 to 0.5.   We refer to the resulting measure as ‘rank i-risk’. 
Tests of P4 require measures financing and investing activities. We measure the 
amount of financing raised during the period as the net cash flows received from 
financing activities (COMPUSTAT data item 113), scaled by average total assets.  We 
measure incremental investment during the period as capital expenditures 
(COMPUSTAT item 90) minus sale of property, plant, and equipment (COMPUSTAT 
item 83) plus acquisitions (COMPUSTAT item 94) minus depreciation and amortization 
(COMPUSTAT item 77), deflated by average total assets (COMPUSTAT item 44).  We 
deduct depreciation and amortization to control for investment that simply maintains 
productive capacity.  All data items are from the COMPUSTAT quarterly files, and we 
cumulate across the trailing four quarters to measure these variables over annual 
measurement intervals.  We also follow the convention of winsorizing these variables at 
the 1st and 99th percentiles to mitigate the impact of extreme outliers. 
 
4. Results 
4.1 Descriptive Statistics 
Institutional ownership data is available on a quarterly basis.  In order to study the 
effects of autocorrelation in ∆BREADTH, we conduct our empirical tests using 
∆BREADTH measured over both quarterly and annual intervals (denoted 
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∆BREADTHQTR and ∆BREADTHANN respectively).  Our sample period is restricted to 
the 22-year period from 1982 to 2004 due to lack of institutional ownership data prior to 
1982.  We compute both quarterly changes and annual changes once every quarter, 
resulting in overlapping annual return measurement intervals.  For the entire sample with 
data available on both CDA/Spectrum and CRSP, we have a total of 457,651 quarterly 
observations and 409,756 annual observations.  Panel A of table 1 presents distributional 
statistics for ∆BREADTH using quarterly data.  The mean value of ∆BREADTH is 
generally positive (overall mean of 0.10%) and the median value is generally zero. Panel 
B reports similar statistics for the annual return measurement interval, indicating that 
both the means and medians are generally positive.  Overall, the results indicate that there 
has been a slight tendency for institutions to diversify their holdings over our sample 
period.  Note that ∆BREADTH tends to be right skewed, indicating that a small number 
of stocks experience extremely large increases in institutional ownership. 
In order for empirical tests of P2 to be well-specified, it is important to control for 
autocorrelation in ∆BREADTH.  Table 2 provides statistics on autocorrelation in 
∆BREADTH using both quarterly and annual measurement intervals.  Panel A of table 2 
reports the mean quarterly value of ∆BREADTH in event time for portfolios formed on 
the decile ranking of ∆BREADTH in event quarter t. The quarter t mean values of 
∆BREADTH are 1.26% for the highest decile and -0.80% for the lowest decile.  These 
numbers indicate that it is unusual for a given security to be added or removed by more 
than 1% of institutional investors during a single quarter.  Perusing the corresponding 
values of ∆BREADTH for quarters t-1 and t+1 reveals strong evidence of positive first 
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order autocorrelation in quarterly ∆BREADTH.  Further perusal of quarters t-4 through 
t+4 suggests that autocorrelation persists at weaker levels well beyond one lead/lag. 
Panel B of table 2 replicates panel A using the annual ∆BREADTH measurement 
interval in place of the quarterly measurement interval.  This table also reveals evidence 
of autocorrelation that lasts for up to three years.  In contrast to panel A, however, the 
autocorrelation is not much stronger at one lead/lag than it is at three leads/lags.  Figure 1 
illustrates the autocorrelation in ∆BREADTH by plotting the mean values of 
∆BREADTH in event time for the extreme quarter t deciles.  The figure clearly 
demonstrates that ∆BREADTH exhibits strong positive first order autocorrelation using 
quarterly data and weaker positive higher order autocorrelations that extend out at least 
three years.  
Panels C and D corroborate the results in panels A and B using Pearson and 
Spearman correlation coefficients.  Panel C highlights the high first order 
autocorrelations using quarterly changes (Pearson≈12%, Spearman≈7%).  Panel C also 
indicates that the second order autocorrelations are weakly negative and the third and 
fourth order autocorrelations are positive.  Panel D highlights the strong positive first 
order autocorrelations using annual data (Pearson≈17%, Spearman≈11%) and also 
indicates that these positive autocorrelations persist at higher orders. 
In summary, ∆BREADTH exhibits strong autocorrelation using both the quarterly 
and annual measurement intervals.  It is important to control for this autocorrelation when 
testing P2.  Recall that P2 predicts that ∆BREADTH is negatively related to future 
returns.  However, P1 predicts that ∆BREADTH is positively related to contemporaneous 
returns.  The combination of P1 and positive autocorrelation in ∆BREADTH leads to the 
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prediction of a positive unconditional relation between ∆BREADTH and future returns.  
The relation between ∆BREADTH and future returns is therefore predicted to be positive 
by P1 and negative by P2.  Thus, attempts to test P2 that do not control for 
autocorrelation in ∆BREADTH are likely to be confounded by the conflicting predictions 
of P1.  One existing study that is subject to this problem is Chen, Hong and Stein (2002).  
Chen et al. find that firms with positive (negative) ∆BREADTH have higher (lower) 
stock returns over the next four quarters.  They attribute this result to a combination of 
differences in investor opinions and short sales constraints.  An alternative explanation is 
that positive autocorrelation in ∆BREADTH combines with P1 to generate the higher 
future stock returns.  Our empirical tests (presented in section 4.3) address this problem 
by controlling for future ∆BREADTH when testing for the relation between current 
∆BREADTH and future returns. 
 
4.2 Investor Recognition and Firm Value 
 The first key prediction of Merton’s model is that security value is increasing in 
investor recognition (our P1).  We test this prediction by examining the relation between 
∆BREADTH and contemporaneous changes in security value.  We measure changes in 
security value using size-adjusted returns, as defined in section 3.  Table 3 reports 
average size-adjusted returns in event time for portfolios of firms formed on decile ranks 
of ∆BREADTH in period t.  Panel A of table 3 presents the results using quarterly 
measurement intervals for quarters t-4 through t+4.  P1 predicts that average returns will 
be increasing in the rank of ∆BREADTH during quarter t.  The results are strongly 
consistent with this prediction, with returns increasing monotonically across 
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∆BREADTH deciles.  Returns for the lowest ∆BREADTH decile are -11.0% and returns 
for the highest ∆BREADTH decile are 14.4%, giving a return spread across the extreme 
deciles of 25.4%. 
The second key prediction from Merton’s model is that expected return is 
decreasing in investor recognition (our P2).  We test this prediction by examining the 
relation between ∆BREADTH and future size-adjusted returns.  Inconsistent with P2, but 
consistent with the results in Chen et al., there is evidence of a weak positive relation 
between ∆BREADTH and stock returns over quarters t+1 through t+3.  Recall, however, 
that ∆BREADTH is positively autocorrelated, and these results do not control for 
autocorrelation in ∆BREADTH.  We will provide tests of P2 that implement such 
controls in section 4.3.  Finally, there is evidence of a strong positive relation between 
∆BREADTH and stock returns over quarters t-4 through t-1, suggesting that investors are 
more likely to open a position in a security with strong recent past returns.  This evidence 
is suggestive of a link between investor recognition and the well-known momentum 
effect in stock returns (see Jegadeesh and Titman, 1993). 
Panel B of table 3 presents similar results to panel A using the annual return 
measurement interval for both ∆BREADTH and returns.  Consistent with P1, there is 
again evidence of a strong positive relation between ∆BREADTH and contemporaneous 
returns. Returns for the lowest ∆BREADTH decile are -35.8% and returns for the highest 
∆BREADTH decile are 54.9%, giving a return spread across the extreme deciles of 
90.7%.  Looking at future returns, we see that there is a weak negative relation with one-
year-ahead returns and a stronger negative relation with two-year-ahead returns.  This 
evidence is broadly consistent with P2.  It appears that the effects of autocorrelation in 
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∆BREADTH on future returns are weaker in the annual data.  There is also evidence of a 
strong positive relation between ∆BREADTH and stock returns over the prior year, but 
this relation turns negative back further than one year.  Thus, investors appear to be 
attracted to stocks with large returns over the last 4 quarters.  These relations are 
illustrated graphically in figure 2. 
There are at least two potential limitations of the results in table 3.  First, there are 
no controls for contemporaneous news about firms’ future cash flows.  Merton’s model 
holds future cash flows constant.  In our empirical tests, however, it is possible that 
∆BREADTH is correlated with cash flow news.  This would be the case if, for example, 
investors are attracted to firms with positive cash flow news.  Such a scenario would 
confound tests of P1, causing us to mistakenly attribute the relation between 
∆BREADTH and contemporaneous stock returns to investor recognition instead of to 
cash flow news. Second, as mentioned above, there are no controls for autocorrelation in 
∆BREADTH.  This confounds the interpretation of tests of P2 concerning the relation 
between ∆BREADTH and future stock returns.  We therefore use multiple regression 
analysis to test P1 and P2 while implementing controls for cash flow news and 
autocorrelation in ∆BREADTH. 
Table 4 provides tests of P1 that control for cash flow news through regressions 
of stock returns on contemporaneous ∆BREADTH and proxies for cash flow news.  For 
brevity, we only present these results using quarterly data.  Following Liu and Thomas 
(2000), we use reported earnings and changes in sell-side analysts’ forecasts of future 
earnings to proxy for cash flow news.  Liu and Thomas demonstrate that incorporating 
information from contemporaneous unexpected earnings as well as changes in analysts’ 
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expectations of future earnings provides an effective proxy for cash flow news.  Since 
analysts’ forecasts are only available for a subset of our observations, we present our 
results in two panels.  Panel A of table 4 presents results for the complete sample using 
reported earnings.  We follow previous research in using seasonally differenced quarterly 
earnings for both the current and most recent quarter as the proxy for cash flow news 
(e.g., Foster, 1977).  We include both the current quarter and the prior quarter because we 
measure stock returns over fiscal quarter intervals.  During a fiscal quarter, earnings for 
the previous quarter will typically be announced.  In addition, it is possible that 
information will be released about earnings for the current quarter (e.g., management 
forecasts).  We therefore expect both the current and lagged unexpected quarterly 
earnings metrics to load with positive coefficients.  Panel B presents results for the 
subsample of firms for which we have analysts’ forecasts.  For this sample we use both 
the earnings surprise announced during quarter t (Forecast Error)2 and the change in the 
consensus analyst forecast of annual earnings per share between the beginning and the 
end of the quarter t (Annual Forecast Revision) to proxy for cash flow news.  All cash 
flow news proxies are measured on a per share basis and deflated by price at the 
beginning of the quarter. 
The results in panels A and B confirm that the explanatory power of ∆BREADTH 
with respect to contemporaneous stock returns is incremental to our proxies for cash flow 
news.  The first column reports results using a simple regression of returns on 
contemporaneous ∆BREADTH.  The reported results are based on the time series means 
                                                          
2 Forecast error is computed as reported earnings per share during the quarter less the consensus analyst 
forecast of earnings per share at the beginning of the quarter.  Note that since earnings are announced 
several days after the end of the quarter, the earnings surprise announced during quarter t will relate to 
earnings for quarter t-1. 
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of cross-sectional regressions by quarter, with t-statistics adjusted using the Newey-West 
correction.  Consistent with P1 and the results in table 4, ∆BREADTH is positive and 
highly significant in both panels.  The second column of each panel reports results from 
regressions of returns on our proxies for cash flow news.  Consistent with prior research, 
all proxies load with positive coefficients and are highly statistically significant.  The 
third column of each panel reports results for multiple regressions containing both 
∆BREADTH and our cash flow proxies.  All variables remain of approximately the same 
magnitudes and significance levels as in the earlier regressions.  These results confirm 
that the relation between ∆BREADTH and contemporaneous stock returns does not arise 
because ∆BREADTH acts as a proxy for cash flow news.  Rather, as predicted by 
Merton’s model, it is consistent with a separate role for investor recognition in the 
determination of security values.  Note also that the regression R2s indicate that investor 
recognition is even more important than cash flow news in explaining contemporaneous 
stock returns.  In particular, the regressions in panel B indicate that investor recognition 
explains 9.3% of the variation in contemporaneous quarterly returns, while cash flow 
news explains only 4.6%. 
The final column of table 4 provides us with our first tests of P3.  Recall that the 
intuition behind P1 and P2 is that investors in neglected stocks will require a risk 
premium to compensate them for bearing idiosyncratic risk.  Ceteris paribus, greater 
idiosyncratic risk will command a greater the risk premium, and so P3 predicts that P1 
will hold more strongly for securities with greater idiosyncratic risk.  The regressions in 
the final column of table 4 include our measure of idiosyncratic risk (rank i-risk) as both 
a main effect and an interactive effect with ∆BREADTH.  If P1 holds more strongly for 
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firms with greater idiosyncratic risk, then the coefficient on the interaction will be 
positive.  Consistent with this prediction, the coefficient on the interaction is positive and 
highly statistically significant.  Intuitively, this result says that increases in investor 
recognition cause much greater increases in firm value for stocks with higher 
idiosyncratic risk.  Figure 3 provides a graphical illustration of the economic magnitude 
of this result.  This figure replicates figure 2, after decomposing the high and low 
∆BREADTH deciles into two equal halves based on rank i-risk.  Thus, for each 
∆BREADTH decile, we can separately track the return performance of the high 
idiosyncratic risk securities and the low idiosyncratic risk securities.  The figure 
illustrates that contemporaneous returns are more than twice as pronounced for the high 
idiosyncratic risk subsamples on both the positive and negative sides.  Thus, P3 is 
strongly supported in the context of P1.  We test P3 in the context of P2 in the next 
subsection. 
 
4.3 Investor Recognition and Future returns 
 The second key prediction of Merton’s model is that expected return is decreasing 
in investor recognition (our P2).  We test this prediction by examining the relation 
between ∆BREADTH and future size-adjusted stock returns.3  We have already seen 
                                                          
3 Merton’s (1987) model predicts that there will be a negative relation between the level of investor 
recognition and expected returns.  Strictly speaking, our changes specification should therefore focus on the 
relation between change in current period investor recognition and the change in expected returns for the 
future period relative to the current period.  By focusing on levels of future realized returns, our analysis 
implicitly assumes that the current period expected return is a cross-sectional constant.  To the extent that 
this approach results in a noisy measure of the change in expected return, it should reduce the power of our 
tests.  Note that the alternative of using the change in realized returns as a proxy for the change in expected 
returns is not feasible, because the unexpected component of the current period realized return is related to 
the current period change in investor recognition through P1.  Further, as discussed earlier in the paper, the 
alternative of testing this prediction using a levels specification involves a major omitted variables problem. 
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preliminary evidence relating to this prediction in table 3.  Recall that the results in table 
3 reveal that the unconditional relation between ∆BREADTH and future returns is 
positive for the first three quarters, and then turns negative beyond three quarters.  
However, the results in table 3 are confounded by the failure to control for 
autocorrelation in ∆BREADTH.  The tests in table 5 remedy this problem. 
 Table 5 reports results from regressions of period t+1 size-adjusted stock returns  
on period t+1 ∆BREADTH, period t ∆BREADTH and period t-1 ∆BREADTH.  Recall 
that P2 predicts that there will be a negative relation between ∆BREADTHt and future 
stock returns.  We therefore predict that ∆BREADTH for period t will load with a 
negative coefficient.  We include ∆BREADTH for periods t-1 and t+1 to control for 
autocorrelation in ∆BREADTH.  In order to illustrate the importance of controlling for 
autocorrelation, the first column of table 5 reports results from simple regressions of 
period t+1 returns on period t ∆BREADTH.  Without controls for autocorrelation, the 
coefficient on ∆BREADTH is positive and marginally significant using quarterly data 
and negative and insignificant using annual data.  These results are broadly consistent 
with the results we observed in table 2 and figure 2.  The second column adds 
∆BREADTH for periods t-1 and t+1 to the regression.  Consistent with P1, ∆BREADTH 
for period t+1 loads with a significantly positive coefficient.  Moreover, consistent with 
P2, ∆BREADTH for period t now loads with a significantly negative coefficient.  The 
change in results between columns 1 and 2 illustrates the importance of controlling for 
autocorrelation in ∆BREADTH in tests of P2.  These results lead us to conclude that the 
results in Chen et al. (2002) are likely to be driven by autocorrelation in ∆BREADTH 
rather than their ‘differences of opinion’ explanation. 
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 The final column of table 5 provides comprehensive tests of P3.  P3 predicts that 
both P1 and P2 will hold more strongly for securities with greater idiosyncratic risk.  
Recall that table 4 provides evidence in support of this P3 with respect to P1.  The final 
column of table 5 simultaneously tests P3 with respect to both P1 and P2.  This is 
accomplished by including interactions for idiosyncratic risk (rank i-risk) with 
∆BREADTHt-1, ∆BREADTH t and ∆BREADTH t+1.4  P3 predicts that the coefficient on 
the ∆BREADTHt+1 interaction will be positive (relating to P1) and the coefficient on the 
∆BREADTHt interaction will be negative (relating to P2).  The results are supportive of 
these predictions in both the annual and quarterly data.  We have already seen that P3 
holds with respect to P1 in table 4, so our current discussion focuses on tests of P3 with 
respect to P2. 
For the quarterly regressions in panel A of table 4, the coefficient on the 
interactive term “∆BreadthQTRt·Rank i-riskQTRt” is negative and marginally statistically 
significant (t=-1.9).  Note, however, that the relatively low statistical significance is 
attributable to a high standard error rather than a lack of economic significance.  The 
coefficient on the main effect for ∆BreadthQTRt is -1.100, while the coefficient on the 
interaction is -2.341.  Recall that the Rank i-risk is based on decile rankings that are 
scaled to range between -0.5 and +0.5, so the coefficient magnitudes suggest that the 
sensitivity of future returns to ∆BreadthQTRt is highly dependent on Rank i-risk.  For 
example, the lowest Rank i-risk decile has an implied ∆BreadthQTRt coefficient of -
1.100+0.5·2.341=0.070, while the highest Rank i-risk decile has an implied ∆BreadthQTRt 
                                                          
4 We also include a main effect for rank i-risk in period t.  For brevity, we omit main effects for rank i-risk 
in periods t-1 and t+1, because rank i-risk is very highly autocorrelated.  Including these additional 
variables has no material effect on the other regression coefficients. 
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coefficient of -1.100-0.5·2.341=-2.271.  The results for the annual regressions in panel B 
of table 5 indicate that the coefficient on the interactive term “∆BreadthANNt·Rank i-
riskANNt” is negative and both economically and statistically significant.  Note that as 
with the quarterly data, the magnitude of the coefficient on the interactive term (-5.350) is 
about twice the coefficient on the main effect (-2.668), highlighting the importance of 
rank i-risk in determining the strength of the negative relation between ∆BREADTH and 
future returns.  The economic significance of these results is quite striking.  For a security 
in the lowest rank i-risk decile (rank i-risk=-0.5), the coefficient on ∆BREADTH will be 
approximately zero, indicating that a change in ∆BREADTH has no effect on expected 
return.  But for a security in the highest rank i-risk decile (rank i-risk=0.5), the coefficient 
on ∆BREADTH will be approximately -5.  This means that an increase in ∆BREADTH 
of 0.01 (i.e., attracting an additional 1% of existing institutional investors) reduces a 
security’s expected return by 0.05 (i.e., the expected return goes down by 5% of security 
price).  In summary, the results in table 5 are uniformly consistent with P3 and are highly 
economically significant. 
The results in table 5 corroborate and extend recent research by Malkiel and Xu 
(2004).  That paper documents evidence of a positive relation between idiosyncratic risk 
and future stock returns.  They argue that these results arise because undiversified 
investors demand a premium for holding idiosyncratic risk.  Our results show that as 
∆BREADTH increases (i.e., investors in a given stock become more diversified), the 
idiosyncratic risk premium falls, and this effect is more pronounced for stocks with high 
idiosyncratic risk. 
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 Table 6 reports an additional set of tests that are designed to further discriminate 
between the differences of opinion hypothesis advanced by Chen et al. (2002) and the 
investor recognition hypothesis advanced in this paper.  Under Chen et al.’s differences 
of opinion hypothesis, high ∆BREADTH indicates that informed investors think that a 
stock is worth holding at its current price, and thus constitutes a positive signal for 
expected returns.  Under the investor recognition hypothesis, high ∆BREADTH indicates 
that more investors know about a security, thus driving its risk premium lower and hence 
its expected returns lower.  Chen et al. attempt to discriminate between their hypothesis 
and the investor recognition hypothesis by decomposing ∆BREADTH into IN-OUT (as 
defined in section 3).  They argue that under the investor recognition hypothesis, if an 
investor decides to add a new security, it is quite likely to signal that the investor did not 
previously know about the security.  However, if an investor decides to sell out of an 
existing security, it is harder to argue that this signals the investor ‘forgot’ about that 
security.  Recall that INt measures new investors opening a position in the stock during 
period t and OUTt measures existing investors closing a position in the stock during 
period t.  Thus, following Chen et al.’s logic, the investor recognition hypothesis predicts 
that the negative relation between ∆BREADTH and expected returns is driven by the IN 
component of ∆BREADTH.  Chen et al. regress future stock returns on IN and OUT and 
find that the coefficients that are positive and of similar magnitudes across these two 
components.  They interpret this evidence as consistent with their differences of opinion 
hypothesis and inconsistent with the investor recognition hypothesis. 
As mentioned earlier in this paper, an alternative explanation for Chen et al.’s 
results is that the positive relation between ∆BREADTHt and future returns results from 
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autocorrelation in ∆BREADTHt.  Recall from figure 1 that mean reversion in 
∆BREADTH is approximately symmetrical for positive and negative innovations.  Thus, 
if positive autocorrelation in ∆BREADTH is driving the positive unconditional relation 
between ∆BREADTH and future returns, we expect this relation to be symmetrical for 
both IN and OUT.  In contrast, the investor recognition hypothesis predicts that after 
controlling for autocorrelation in ∆BREADTH, the negative relation between 
∆BREADTH and future returns will be primarily attributable to IN as opposed to OUT. 
 Table 6 begins by reporting regressions similar to those in Chen at al.  The first 
column reports regressions of future returns on IN and OUT without controlling for 
autocorrelation in ∆BREADTH.  Similar to the results in Chen et al., the quarterly results 
in panel A reveal a significant relation that is approximately symmetrical across IN and 
OUT.  The annual results in panel B are insignificant.  The results in the second column 
of table 6 include controls for autocorrelation in ∆BREADTH and tell a very different 
story, one that is uniformly consistent with the predictions of the investor recognition 
hypothesis.  Recall from table 5 that after controlling for autocorrelation in ∆BREADTH, 
there is a significantly negative coefficient on ∆BREADTHt using both quarterly and 
annual data.  The results in table 6 show that this negative coefficient is entirely 
attributable to INt.  INt is negative and highly significant in both the quarterly and annual 
regressions, while OUTt is insignificant.  Furthermore, the positive coefficient on 
∆BREADTHt+1 from table 5 is much stronger for INt+1 than for OUTt+1 (note that the sign 
of the coefficient on OUT is reversed relative to that on ∆BREADTH, because 
∆BREADTH=IN-OUT).  In other words, the positive association between ∆BREADTH 
and contemporaneous returns is much stronger for IN than for OUT and the negative 
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relation between ∆BREADTH and future returns is much stronger for IN than for OUT.  
These results are uniformly consistent with the investor recognition hypothesis. 
 
4.4 Investor Recognition and Real Corporate Activities 
The fourth key prediction from Merton’s model is that corporate financing and 
investing activities are positively related to changes in investor recognition (our P4).  
Recall that the intuition behind this prediction is that the increased valuation and lower 
expected return accompanying an increase in investor recognition lead to a reduction in 
the cost of capital, making new financing and investing activities more attractive.  An 
important research design issue in developing tests of P4 is the specification of the lag 
between changes in investor recognition and changes in firms’ financing and investing 
activities.  It is possible that it could take managers several quarters to implement 
changes in their firms’ real activities.  Rather than speculating as to the length of this 
implementation period, we examine financing and investing activities for a wide interval 
surrounding periods of extreme changes in investor recognition. 
Empirical results for tests of P4 are presented in table 7.  This table reports the 
mean values of our corporate financing and investing variables for portfolios formed on 
decile ranks of ∆BREADTH.  Our corporate financing and investing variables are 
constructed using data from the statement of cash flows.  Corporate financing activity is 
measured as net cash from financing activities, while corporate investing activity is 
measured as capital expenditures plus acquisitions less depreciation and sales of property 
and equipment.  Both variables are deflated by average total assets.  We report results 
using both quarterly and annual measurement intervals.  For the quarterly measurement 
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interval, firms are ranked into deciles based on the magnitude of ∆BREADTH in quarter 
t, and corresponding mean values of financing and investment are reported for quarters t-
4 through t+4.  For the annual measurement interval, firms are ranked into deciles based 
on the magnitude of ∆BREADTH in year t, and corresponding mean values of financing 
and investment are reported for years t-3 through t+3. 
Panel A of table 7 reports results for our financing variable.  Consistent with P4, 
there is strong evidence of a positive contemporaneous relation between financing and 
∆BREADTH in both the quarterly and annual data.  Using quarterly (annual) data, the 
spread in financing between the high and low ∆BREADTH portfolios is 2.95% (8.58%) 
with a corresponding t-statistic of 34.4 (42.9).  These results are clearly both highly 
statistically and economically significant.  There is also evidence that ∆BREADTH is 
positively related to financing for up to two years in the future, but the contemporaneous 
relation is the strongest.  Thus, the evidence suggests that managers respond very quickly 
to changes in investor recognition by immediately raising new financing. 
Panel B of table 7 reports similar results to panel A using the investment variable 
in place of the financing variable.  The results are broadly consistent with those in panel 
A, with two notable exceptions.  First, the contemporaneous relation between 
∆BREADTH and investment is somewhat weaker than it was for financing.  Using 
quarterly (annual) data, the spread in investment between the high and low ∆BREADTH 
portfolios is 0.40% (2.70%) with a corresponding t-statistic of 16.3 (32.3).  Second, there 
is much stronger evidence of a positive relation between ∆BREADTH and future changes 
in investment.  The annual data indicates that the positive relation between ∆BREADTH 
and investment is strongest in the year following the ∆BREADTH ranking year and is 
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still significant 3 years after the ranking year.  The general picture that emerges from 
panels A and B is that firms immediately raise new financing in response to increases in 
investor recognition, and then gradually invest the proceeds over the next several years.  
This result is intuitively appealing, since it indicates that firms take full advantage of their 
lower cost of capital by raising enough financing to cover their investment opportunities 
for the next several years. 
Overall, the results in table 7 confirm that investor recognition is positively 
related to both financing and investing.  In addition to confirming P4, these results 
provide a potential explanation for why previous research has found that both financing 
and investing are negatively related to future stock returns (e.g., Ritter, 2003; Titman, 
Wei and Xie, 2004).  Previous research refers to these results as stock return ‘anomalies’, 
because they are difficult to reconcile with market efficiency.  The investor recognition 
hypothesis provides a potential explanation for these anomalies.  Merton’s model links 
both financing and investment to contemporaneous changes in investor recognition and 
provides an explanation as to why investor recognition has a negative relation with 
expected returns.  Financing and investing could simply be proxies for investor 
recognition, thus explaining their negative relation with future returns.  Unfortunately, 
empirical tests of this conjecture are problematic, because all we have to work with is 
∆BREADTH, which is itself a noisy proxy for investor recognition.  It is unreasonable to 
expect ∆BREADTH to completely subsume these other variables in predicting future 
stock returns.  It is likely that each of measures provides incremental information about 
the underlying investor recognition construct.5
                                                          
5 In unreported empirical tests, we find that ∆BREADTH, investment and external financing each have 




This paper analyzes the relation between investor recognition and future stock 
returns.  Consistent with Merton’s (1987) theoretical analysis, we find that  (i) security 
value is increasing in investor recognition, (ii) expected return is decreasing in investor 
recognition, (iii) the above two relations are increasing in a security’s idiosyncratic risk, 
and (iv) financing and investing activities are increasing in investor recognition. 
Our research has implications for the large body of existing research on the role of 
cash flow news versus expected return news in explaining cross-sectional variation in 
security returns (e.g., Roll, 1988; Campbell, 1991; Vuolteenaho, 2002).  We identify 
investor recognition as an important determinant of expected return news and we show 
that changes in investor recognition appear to be as important as cash flow news in 
explaining security returns.  Explicit consideration of investor recognition should allow 
for the refinement of future research in this area. 
Our research also has implications for the large body of literature documenting 
‘anomalous’ determinants of expected returns.  We have already shown that investor 
recognition is related to financing and investment in such a way that investor recognition 
provides a potential explanation for the negative returns following these activities.  
Investor recognition also has the potential to explain a number of other anomalies.  For 
example, Sloan (1996) and Richardson, Sloan, Soliman and Tuna (2005) show that 
accruals are negatively related to future returns.  Accruals basically represent investments 
in operating assets, and so increased investor recognition should lead to higher accruals 
and lower expected returns.  As a second example, Jegadeesh and Titman (1993) show 
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that stock returns are positively autotcorrelated over measurement intervals of 3-12 
months.  Since changes in investor recognition are also positively autocorrelated over 
measurement intervals of 3-12 months, autocorrelation in investor recognition could 
drive momentum in stock returns.  As a final example, Lakonishok, Shleifer and Vishny 
(1994) find that fundamental to price ratios (e.g., book-to-market, earnings-to-price) are 
positively related to future stock returns.  Increased investor recognition will lead to 
higher security values and lower expected returns, thus inducing a negative relation 
between fundamental to price ratios and future returns.  The challenge for future research 
in this area is to determine how much of the return predictability of these ‘anomalies’ is 
attributable to investor recognition. 
Our research leaves several questions unanswered.  Foremost among these are the 
determinants of investor recognition.  What factors cause investors to be cognizant of 
some securities, but not others?  Figure 2 suggests that investors tend to recognize stocks 
with strong recent price performance.  The evidence in table 7 suggests that perhaps firms 
that are raising new financing engage activities that increase investor recognition.  In fact, 
one can argue that a primary role of investment bankers is to enhance investor 
recognition of their clients’ securities.  A second question concerns the measurement 
investor recognition.  Our ∆BREADTH measure provides one potential proxy that 
performs well in empirical tests.  But this measure has limitations and can likely be 
improved upon.  The application of factor analysis to a broad range on investor 
recognition proxies offers one potential avenue for improvement. 
Finally, our research highlights the value of corporate investor relations activities 
that increase investor recognition.  We show that such activities have the potential to 
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unlock large amounts of value and substantially lower the cost of capital.  As such, our 
research provides additional evidence supporting Brennan and Tamorowksi’s (2000) 
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Panel A: Mean reversion in quarterly change in investor recognition (∆BreadthQTR)
Panel B: Mean reversion in annual change in investor recognition (∆BreadthANN)
Panel A depicts the average values of ∆BreadthQTR for the top and bottom quarter t decile rankings of ∆BreadthQTR in quarters t-4 to t+4 . Panel B
depicts the average values of ∆BreadthANN for the top and bottom quarter t decile rankings of ∆BreadthANN in years t-3 to t+3 . Percentage quarterly
change in breadth (∆BreadthQTR) equals the difference in the number of institutions (13F filers) holding the firm's stock at the beginning and at the end
of the quarter divided by the total number of institutions at the beginning of the quarter and multiplied by 100. Percentage annual change in breadth
(∆BreadthANN) equals the difference in the number of institutions holding the firm's stock at the end of quarter t-4 and at the end of the current quarter
divided by the total number of institutions at the end of quarter t-4, and multiplied by 100.
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Quarterly and Annual Size-Adjusted Returns for the Highest and Lowest              
Decile Rankings of the Change Investor Recognition
Panel A: Quarterly returns for highest and lowest decile rankings of ∆BreadthQTR 
Panel B: Annual returns for highest and lowest decile rankings of ∆BreadthANN 
Panel A depicts the average quarterly size-adjusted returns for the top and bottom quarter-t decile rankings of ∆BreadthQTR in
quarters t-4 to t+4. Panel B depicts the average annual size-adjusted returns for the top and bottom quarter-t decile rankings of
∆BreadthANN in years t-3 to t+3. Size-adjusted returns are computed as the difference between the return on a firm's size
decile portfolio return and the return for the firm during quartert+k or yeart+k. Size portfolios are determined based on decile
assignment for all NYSE/AMEX firms. Percentage quarterly change in breadth (∆BreadthQTR) equals the difference in the
number of institutions (13F filers) holding the firm's stock at the beginning and at the end of the quarter divided by the total
number of institutions at the beginning of the quarter and multiplied by 100. Percentage annual change in breadth
(∆BreadthANN) equals the difference in the number of institutions holding the firm's stock at the end of quarter t-4 and at the


















































Average Quarterly and Annual Size-Adjusted Returns for the Top and Bottom Decile Rankings 
of Change in Investor Recognition, by High and Low Idiosyncratic Risk
Panel A: Quarterly returns top and bottom decile rankings of ∆BreadthQTR , by idiosyncratic risk






















Qtr t-4 Qtr t-3 Qtr t-2 Qtr t-1 Qtr t Qtr t+1 Qtr t+2 Qtr t+3 Qtr t+4
Top ∆Breadth Decile, high i-risk
Top ∆Breadth Decile, low i-risk
Bottom ∆Breadth Decile, low i-risk
















Year t-3 Year t-2 Year t-1 Year t Year t+1 Year t+2 Year t+3
Top ∆Breadth Decile, high i-risk
Top ∆Breadth Decile, low i-risk
Bottom ∆Breadth Decile, low i-risk
Bottom ∆Breadth Decile, high i-risk
Panel A depicts the average quarterly size-adjusted returns for the top and bottom quarter-t decile rankings of 
∆BreadthQTR in quarters t-4 to t+4, stratified by high and low quarterly idiosyncratic risk. Panel B depicts the 
average annual quarterly size-adjusted returns for the top and bottom quarter-t decile rankings of ∆BreadthANN in 
years t-3 to t+3, stratified by high and low annual idiosyncratic risk. Size-adjusted returns are computed as the 
difference between the return on a firm's size decile portfolio return and the return for the firm during quartert+k or 
yeart+k. Size portfolios are determined based on decile assignment for all NYSE/AMEX firms. Quarterly (annual) 
idiosyncratic risk is the square root of the sum over the prior 3 (12) months of monthly idiosyncratic risk measures. 
The monthly measures equal the sum of the daily squared excess return, which equal the difference between the 
daily value-weighted industry return and the firm’s daily returns. Industry classifications are based on Fama and 
French (1997). High (low) idiosyncratic risk are defined with respect to the quarterly median. Percentage quarterly 
change in breadth (∆BreadthQTR) equals the difference in the number of institutions (13F filers) holding the firm's
stock at the beginning and at the end of the quarter divided by the total number of institutions at the beginning of
the quarter and multiplied by 100.  Percentage annual change in breadth (∆BreadthANN) equals the difference in the 
number of institutions holding the firm's stock at the end of quarter t-4 and at the end of the current quarter divided 
by the total number of institutions at the end of quarter t-4, and multiplied by 100.
Panel A: Quarterly change in investor recognition (∆BreadthQTR)
1982 10,847 0.16% -0.19% 0.00% 0.38% 0.79%
1983 12,030 0.10% -0.18% 0.00% 0.19% 0.78%
1984 14,067 0.12% -0.16% 0.00% 0.33% 0.72%
1985 14,438 0.21% 0.00% 0.00% 0.31% 0.97%
1986 15,370 0.03% -0.14% 0.00% 0.15% 0.85%
1987 16,326 0.17% -0.13% 0.00% 0.26% 0.78%
1988 16,996 0.08% -0.12% 0.00% 0.25% 0.65%
1989 16,974 -0.05% -0.13% 0.00% 0.12% 1.08%
1990 16,855 0.17% -0.11% 0.00% 0.22% 1.03%
1991 16,905 0.05% -0.11% 0.00% 0.11% 0.59%
1992 17,744 0.14% -0.10% 0.00% 0.21% 0.61%
1993 19,376 -0.06% -0.20% 0.00% 0.10% 0.71%
1994 22,008 0.12% -0.11% 0.00% 0.21% 0.87%
1995 22,878 0.17% -0.08% 0.08% 0.27% 0.59%
1996 24,269 -0.05% -0.18% 0.00% 0.09% 0.66%
1997 25,674 0.20% -0.08% 0.08% 0.27% 0.83%
1998 26,345 0.13% -0.08% 0.00% 0.22% 0.95%
1999 25,790 0.16% -0.08% 0.00% 0.22% 1.05%
2000 25,819 0.10% -0.12% 0.00% 0.19% 0.80%
2001 25,146 0.02% -0.11% 0.00% 0.12% 0.89%
2002 24,238 0.08% -0.11% 0.00% 0.18% 0.81%
2003 23,528 0.15% -0.05% 0.05% 0.27% 0.70%
2004 24,028 0.12% -0.05% 0.05% 0.25% 0.61%
Overall 457,651 0.10% -0.11% 0.00% 0.21% 0.81%
Panel B: Annual Change in investor recognition (∆BreadthANN)
1982 9,348 0.38% -0.21% 0.23% 0.70% 1.73%
1983 9,988 0.74% 0.00% 0.22% 1.26% 1.90%
1984 11,447 0.49% -0.19% 0.20% 0.83% 1.63%
1985 12,737 0.76% 0.00% 0.35% 1.13% 1.79%
1986 13,177 0.79% 0.00% 0.34% 1.04% 2.02%
1987 14,145 0.47% -0.16% 0.16% 0.64% 1.70%
1988 14,896 0.33% -0.15% 0.15% 0.58% 1.40%
1989 15,305 0.48% 0.00% 0.14% 0.71% 1.64%
1990 15,412 0.12% -0.29% 0.00% 0.38% 1.59%
1991 15,484 0.39% -0.23% 0.12% 0.50% 1.72%
1992 15,634 0.43% -0.12% 0.12% 0.69% 1.35%
1993 16,880 0.27% -0.22% 0.11% 0.56% 1.44%
1994 18,829 0.10% -0.22% 0.00% 0.34% 1.25%
1995 20,547 0.50% -0.11% 0.11% 0.64% 1.55%
1996 21,276 0.25% -0.19% 0.00% 0.48% 1.28%
1997 22,729 0.30% -0.19% 0.09% 0.52% 1.28%
1998 23,206 0.64% -0.09% 0.18% 0.89% 1.74%
1999 23,131 0.35% -0.16% 0.08% 0.48% 1.78%
2000 22,931 0.58% -0.16% 0.08% 0.75% 2.17%
2001 23,000 0.36% -0.21% 0.07% 0.70% 1.67%
2002 22,731 0.18% -0.19% 0.06% 0.50% 1.47%
2003 22,218 0.47% -0.06% 0.12% 0.83% 1.37%
2004 22,225 0.61% 0.00% 0.29% 1.04% 1.26%
Overall 409,756 0.43% -0.14% 0.12% 0.68% 1.63%
Q3 STD
N
Year N Mean Q1 Median
STD
Table 1
Descriptive Statistics for Quarterly and Annual Change in Investor Recognition
This table reports statistics on our measure of investor recognition for observations that are available on both CDA/Spectrum 13F
institutional transaction quarterly database and CRSP tapes. Percentage quarterly change in investor recognition (∆BreadthQTR) in Panel
A equals the difference in the number of institutions (13F filers) holding the firm's stock at the beginning and at the end of the quarter
divided by the total number of institutions at the beginning of the quarter and multiplied by 100. Percentage annual change in breadth
(∆BreadthANN) Panel B equals the difference in the number of institutions holding the firm's stock at the end of quarter t-4 and at the end
of the current quarter divided by the total number of institutions at the end of quarter t-4, and multiplied by 100. 
Year Q1 Median Q3Mean
Panel A: Mean quarterly change in investor recognition, by rank of ∆BreadthQTR in quarter t
Rank of 
∆BreadthQTR 
Qtr t-4 Qtr t-3 Qtr t-2 Qtr t-1 Qtr t Qtr t+1 Qtr t+2 Qtr t+3 Qtr t+4
Lowest 0.22% 0.25% 0.31% 0.15% -0.80% 0.02% 0.16% 0.10% 0.08%
2 0.07% 0.09% 0.11% 0.07% -0.22% 0.07% 0.10% 0.07% 0.06%
3 0.05% 0.05% 0.06% 0.05% -0.11% 0.05% 0.06% 0.05% 0.06%
4 0.04% 0.03% 0.04% 0.02% -0.04% 0.05% 0.05% 0.04% 0.03%
5 0.03% 0.03% 0.04% 0.04% 0.00% 0.04% 0.04% 0.03% 0.05%
6 0.04% 0.04% 0.01% 0.03% 0.03% 0.03% 0.04% 0.05% 0.03%
7 0.04% 0.04% 0.04% 0.03% 0.11% 0.04% 0.04% 0.04% 0.06%
8 0.07% 0.08% 0.05% 0.05% 0.18% 0.06% 0.06% 0.08% 0.08%
9 0.15% 0.13% 0.11% 0.13% 0.38% 0.13% 0.09% 0.11% 0.12%
Highest 0.34% 0.33% 0.28% 0.43% 1.26% 0.30% 0.16% 0.20% 0.20%
Panel B: Mean annual changes in investor recognition, by rank of ∆BreadthANN in year t
Rank of 
∆BreadthANN
Year t-3 Year t-2 Year t-1 Year t Year t+1 Year t+2 Year t+3
Lowest 0.99% 1.12% 0.85% -1.53% 0.33% 0.60% 0.47%
2 0.36% 0.36% 0.29% -0.37% 0.28% 0.34% 0.28%
3 0.20% 0.19% 0.16% -0.15% 0.19% 0.23% 0.21%
4 0.15% 0.14% 0.12% -0.03% 0.18% 0.19% 0.18%
5 0.14% 0.13% 0.09% 0.05% 0.16% 0.17% 0.17%
6 0.18% 0.15% 0.13% 0.16% 0.20% 0.22% 0.22%
7 0.25% 0.21% 0.18% 0.29% 0.25% 0.25% 0.27%
8 0.39% 0.35% 0.33% 0.54% 0.37% 0.35% 0.37%
9 0.66% 0.60% 0.63% 1.16% 0.61% 0.52% 0.57%
Highest 1.31% 1.13% 1.39% 3.35% 1.02% 0.76% 0.88%
Panel C: Pearson (above diagonal) and Spearman correlation coefficients for quarterly changes in investor recognition
 ∆BreadthQtr t  ∆BreadthQtr t+1  ∆BreadthQtr t+2  ∆BreadthQtr t+3  ∆BreadthQtr t+4
 ∆BreadthQtr t 11.54% -4.42% 4.45% 7.80%
 ∆BreadthQtr t+1 6.78% 12.09% -6.02% 4.81%
 ∆BreadthQtr t+2 -0.73% 6.90% 12.34% -6.59%
 ∆BreadthQtr t+3 4.00% -0.89% 6.88% 12.09%
 ∆BreadthQtr t+4 4.52% 4.00% -1.04% 6.72%
Panel D: Pearson (above diagonal) and Spearman correlation coefficients for annual changes in investor recognition
 ∆BreadthYr t  ∆BreadthYr t+1  ∆BreadthYr t+2  ∆BreadthYr t+3
 ∆BreadthYr t 16.72% 4.75% 10.79%
 ∆BreadthYr t+1 10.67% 17.90% 4.70%
 ∆BreadthYr t+2 5.09% 11.10% 17.98%
 ∆BreadthYr t+3 9.08% 5.29% 11.13%
Table 2
Mean Reversion and Autocorrelations in the Change in Investor Recognition
Panel A provides averages of ∆BreadthQTR in quarters t-4 to t+4 by decile rankings of current quarter ∆BreadthQTR. Panel B reports averages of
∆BreadthANN from years t-3 to t+3 by decile rankings of current quarter ∆BreadthANN. Panels C and D provides Pearson and Spearman correlation
coefficients for quarterly and annual changes in investor recognition, respectively. Percentage quarterly change in breadth (∆BreadthQTR) equals the
difference in the number of institutions (13F filers) holding the firm's stock at the beginning and at the end of the quarter divided by the total number
of institutions at the beginning of the quarter and multiplied by 100. Percentage annual change in breadth (∆BreadthANN) equals the difference in the
number of institutions holding the firm's stock at the end of quarter t-4 and at the end of the current quarter divided by the total number of institutions
at the end of quarter t-4, and multiplied by 100.
Panel A: Mean quarterly size-adjusted returns by ranks of ∆BreadthQTR 
Rank of ∆BreadthQTR Qtr t-4 Qtr t-3 Qtr t-2 Qtr t-1 Qtr t Qtr t+1 Qtr t+2 Qtr t+3 Qtr t+4
Lowest 2.1% 0.7% -1.1% -5.4% -11.0% -0.5% -0.2% -0.3% 0.9%
2 -0.2% -1.0% -2.3% -3.6% -4.9% -0.4% 0.0% 0.1% 0.5%
3 -1.1% -1.4% -2.3% -3.3% -3.5% 0.0% 0.1% 0.4% 0.3%
4 -0.8% -1.4% -1.5% -1.6% -1.8% 0.2% -0.3% 0.2% 0.2%
5 -1.0% -1.1% -2.0% -2.4% -2.7% -0.7% -0.2% 0.5% 0.4%
6 -1.1% -1.0% -0.6% -0.5% -0.7% -0.3% 0.2% 0.0% 0.4%
7 0.3% -0.2% -0.1% 0.3% 0.0% -0.3% 0.1% 0.4% 0.3%
8 0.5% 0.6% 1.1% 1.4% 1.9% 0.4% 0.4% 0.2% 0.1%
9 2.2% 2.3% 3.1% 4.3% 6.0% 0.9% 0.6% 0.1% 0.3%
Highest 4.1% 5.4% 6.8% 9.9% 14.4% 1.2% 0.5% 0.5% -0.3%
Highest-Lowest 2.0% 4.7% 7.9% 15.3% 25.4% 1.7% 0.6% 0.7% -1.2%
t -statistic 10.8 23.4 38.8 78.7 138.4 10.4 3.8 4.2 -6.6
Panel B: Mean annual size-adjusted returns by ranks of ∆BreadthANN 
Rank of ∆BreadthANN Year t-3 Year t-2 Year t-1 Year t Year t+1 Year t+2 Year t+3
Lowest 16.3% 19.2% 0.4% -35.8% 3.9% 8.6% 4.6%
2 6.4% 4.5% -7.9% -22.8% 4.6% 6.8% 3.5%
3 0.6% -1.6% -6.3% -15.5% 4.6% 5.0% 1.7%
4 -1.3% -2.7% -6.3% -10.6% 3.3% 3.1% 2.3%
5 -0.2% -2.0% -5.0% -7.9% 2.9% 2.5% -0.2%
6 0.4% 0.8% -0.1% -2.8% 0.6% 1.8% 1.7%
7 3.2% 1.8% 3.2% 3.3% 1.0% 1.5% 1.6%
8 3.7% 5.6% 8.8% 11.4% 0.6% 0.8% 2.5%
9 8.0% 8.4% 16.9% 23.8% 1.2% 0.8% 3.2%
Highest 10.5% 10.7% 26.0% 54.9% 0.3% -0.6% 3.5%
Highest-Lowest -5.7% -8.5% 25.6% 90.7% -3.6% -9.2% -1.1%
t -statistic -8.4 -5.6 36.7 115.7 -6.4 -14.9 -1.7
Table 3
Average Size-Adjusted Returns by Ranks of Change in Investor Recognition
Panel A reports the average quarterly size-adjusted returns for the top and bottom quarter-t decile rankings of ∆BreadthQTR
in quarters t-4 to t+4. Panel B reports the average annual size-adjusted returns for the top and bottom quarter-t decile 
rankings of ∆BreadthANN in years t-3 to t+3. Size-adjusted returns are computed as the difference between the return on a
firm's size decile portfolio return and the return for the firm during quartert+k or yeart+k. Size portfolios are determined based 
on decile assignment for all NYSE/AMEX firms. Percentage quarterly change in breadth (∆BreadthQTR) equals the 
difference in the number of institutions (13F filers) holding the firm's stock at the beginning and at the end of the quarter
divided by the total number of institutions at the beginning of the quarter and multiplied by 100.  Percentage annual change
in breadth (∆BreadthANN) equals the difference in the number of institutions holding the firm's stock at the end of quarter t-4 
and at the end of the current quarter divided by the total number of institutions at the end of quarter t-4, and multiplied by 
100. The t-statistics are adjusted using the Newey-West correction with four lags. 
Panel A: Regressions using seasonally differences in quarterly earnings to measure cash-flow news
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Intercept -0.005 0.005 -0.004 -0.005
-1.4 1.6 -1.1 -1.6
∆BreadthQtr t 8.041 7.742 12.504
14.3 14.2 22.6
Rank i-riskQtr t 0.035
1.6
∆BreadthQtr t  ·  rank i-riskQtr t 24.502
17.5
∆EarningsQtr t-1 0.601 0.550 0.520
10.2 9.9 10.2
∆EarningsQtr t 0.238 0.222 0.187
6.1 6.0 5.3
R2 4.4% 2.2% 6.3% 12.0%
Average quarterly N 2,257 2,257 2,257 2,257
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Intercept -0.006 0.017 0.004 0.009
-1.6 6.7 1.0 2.1
∆BreadthQtr t 8.847 8.202 11.368
15.0 14.2 18.1
Rank i-riskQtr t 0.029
1.2
∆BreadthQtr t  ·  rank i-riskQtr t 20.552
13.6
Forecast ErrorsQtr t 1.043 0.924 0.912
9.1 8.8 9.0
Annual Forecast RevisionQtr t 1.787 1.320 1.228
18.4 15.0 15.9
R2 9.3% 4.6% 12.3% 20.4%
Average quarterly N 2,076 2,076 2,076 2,076
Table 4
Panel B: Regressions using forecast errors and forecast revisions to measure cash-flow news 
Regression Analysis of Quarterly Size-Adjusted Returns on Change in Investor Recognition, Earnings 
Surprise, and Idiosyncratic Risk
This table reports mean coefficient estimates and t-statistics from quarterly regressions of quarterly size-adjusted returns on 
∆BreadthQTRt, ranks of idiosyncratic risk, current and prior seasonal change in reported earnings (Panel A) and analyst forecast
errors and forecast revisions reported during the calendar quarter (panel B). Data availability reduced the sample to 80 quarters 
(1985Q1 to 2004Q4). Percentage quarterly change in breadth (∆BreadthQTR) equals the difference in the number of institutions 
(13F filers) holding the firm's stock at the beginning and at the end of the quarter divided by the total number of institutions at the
beginning of the quarter and multiplied by 100. Quarterly idiosyncratic risk is the square root of the sum over the prior 3 months of 
monthly idiosyncratic risk measures. The monthly measures equal the sum of the daily squared excess return, which equal the 
difference between the daily value-weighted industry return and the firm’s daily returns. Industry classifications are based on Fama 
and French (1997). The idiosyncratic risk measures are ranked each quarter into deciles and the ranks are normalized to range from
-.5 to +.5. Change in earnings is computed as the seasonal change in earnings before extraordinary items (data #8) scaled by 
average total assets. Forecast errors are computed as the actual reported earnings (per I/B/E/S) minus the consensus earnings
forecast outstanding prior to the earnings announcement divided by price at the beginning of the period. Annual forecast revision 
equals the change in the consensus annual earnings forecast between the beginning and the end of the quarter, scaled by price at the
beginning of the quarter. Quarterly size-adjusted return is computed as the difference between the return on a firm's size decile 
portfolio return and the return for the firm during the quarter. Size portfolios are determined based on decile assignment for all
NYSE/AMEX firms. The t-statistics are adjusted using the Newey-West correction with four lags. 
Intercept 0.001 -0.005 -0.004
0.6 -1.7 -1.4
∆BreadthQTR t-1 -0.029 -0.121
-0.2 -0.7
∆BreadthQTR t 0.375 -0.989 -1.100
1.4 -3.2 -3.4
∆BreadthQTR t+1 9.635 12.307
9.1 11.3
Rank i-riskQTR t -0.019
-1.2
∆BreadthQTR t-1  ·  Rank i-riskQTR t-1 -0.505
-1.2
∆BreadthQTR t  ·  Rank i-riskQTR t -2.341
-1.9
∆BreadthQTR t+1  · Rank i-riskQTR t+1 23.481
8.8
Average quarterly N 4,010 4,010 4,010
R2 0.2% 5.2% 9.8%
Intercept 0.033 -0.013 -0.016
3.2 -1.2 -1.3
∆BreadthANN t-1 -1.654 -1.287
-4.3 -4.3
∆BreadthANN t -0.634 -2.958 -2.668
-1.2 -5.0 -4.9
∆BreadthANN t+1 14.887 19.969
8.6 11.0
Rank i-riskANN t 0.020
0.4
∆BreadthANN t-1  ·  Rank i-riskANN t-1 -3.331
-2.8
∆BreadthANN t  · Rank i-riskANN t -5.350
-3.4
∆BreadthANN t+1  ·  Rank i-riskANN t+1 36.739
7.7
Average quarterly N 2,977 2,977 2,977
R2 0.4% 12.6% 19.9%
Table 5
Regression Analysis of Future Size-Adjusted Returns on Prior, Current, and Future Measures of 
Change in Investor Recognition, and Idiosyncratic Risk
Panel B: Regressions using annual measures
Panel A: Regressions using quarterly measures
Panel A (B) of this table reports mean coefficient estimates and t-statistics from quarterly regressions of one-quarter-
ahead (one-year-ahead) size-adjusted returns on prior, current, and next period measures of the change investor 
recognition and their interactive terms with idiosyncratic risk. The requirement of variable leads and lags reduced the 
sample size to 90 quarters in Panel A (1982Q2 to 2004Q3) and 84 quarters in Panel B (1983Q1-2003Q4). Percentage 
quarterly change in breadth (∆BreadthQTR) equals the difference in the number of institutions (13F filers) holding the
firm's stock at the beginning and at the end of the quarter divided by the total number of institutions at the beginning of
the quarter and multiplied by 100.  Size-adjusted returns are computed as the difference between the return on a firm's
size decile portfolio return and the return for the firm during quartert+k or yeart+k. Size portfolios are determined based on 
decile assignment for all NYSE/AMEX firms. Quarterly (annual) idiosyncratic risk is the square root of the sum over the 
prior 3 (12) months of monthly idiosyncratic risk measures. The monthly measures equal the sum of the daily squared 
excess return, which equal the difference between the daily value-weighted industry return and the firm’s daily returns. 
Industry classifications are based on Fama and French (1997). The idiosyncratic risk measures are ranked each quarter 
into deciles and the ranks are normalized to range from -.5 to +.5. Percentage quarterly change in breadth (∆BreadthQTR) 
equals the difference in the number of institutions (13F filers) holding the firm's stock at the beginning and at the end of
the quarter divided by the total number of institutions at the beginning of the quarter and multiplied by 100.  Percentage 
annual change in breadth (∆BreadthANN) equals the difference in the number of institutions holding the firm's stock at the
end of quarter t-4 and at the end of the current quarter divided by the total number of institutions at the end of quarter t-4, 
and multiplied by 100. The t-statistics are adjusted using the Newey-West correction with four lags. 
















Average Quarterly N 4,651 4,651
















Average Quarterly N 3,346 3,346
Table 6
Regression Analysis of Future Size-Adjusted Returns on Prior, Current, and Future  
Components (IN and OUT) of Change in Investor Recognition
Panel A (B) of this table reports mean coefficient estimates and t-statistics from quarterly regressions of 
one-quarter-ahead (one-year-ahead) size-adjusted returns on prior, current, and next period decomposed 
measures of the change investor recognition. The requirement of variable leads and lags reduced the sample
size to 90 quarters in Panel A (1982Q2 to 2004Q3) and 84 quarters in Panel B (1983Q1-2003Q4). Our 
measure of investor recognition, ΔBREADTHt, is decomposed to ΔBREADTHt=INt-OUTt, where INt 
(OUTt) equals the fraction of 13Ffilers in both period t-1 and period t that have a zero (non-zero) holding in 
the stock in the prior period and a non-zero (zero) holding in the stock in the current period. Percentage 
quarterly change in breadth (∆BreadthQTR) equals the difference in the number of institutions (13F filers)
holding the firm's stock at the beginning and at the end of the quarter divided by the total number of
institutions at the beginning of the quarter and multiplied by 100.  Percentage annual change in breadth
(∆BreadthANN) equals the difference in the number of institutions holding the firm's stock at the end of
quarter t-4 and at the end of the current quarter divided by the total number of institutions at the end of 
quarter t-4, and multiplied by 100. Size-adjusted returns are computed as the difference between the return
on a firm's size decile portfolio return and the return for the firm during quartert+k or yeart+k. Size portfolios 
are determined based on decile assignment for all NYSE/AMEX firms. The t-statistics are adjusted using 
the Newey-West correction with four lags. 
Panel A: Financing by ranks of change in investor recognition
Qtr t-4 Qtr t-3 Qtr t-2 Qtr t-1 Qtr t Qtr t+1 Qtr t+2 Qtr t+3 Qtr t+4 Year t-3 Year t-2 Year t-1 Year t Year t+1 Year t+2 Year t+3
Lowest 2.07% 2.06% 1.80% 1.67% 0.51% 0.66% 0.71% 0.67% 0.60% 10.33% 11.02% 10.42% 2.41% 1.69% 2.08% 2.14%
2 2.08% 2.25% 2.02% 1.86% 1.15% 1.35% 1.51% 1.41% 1.27% 9.72% 10.12% 8.79% 3.56% 3.89% 4.33% 4.40%
3 1.86% 1.56% 1.84% 1.58% 1.15% 1.51% 1.44% 1.35% 1.48% 7.75% 7.80% 7.26% 4.28% 5.22% 5.03% 4.63%
4 2.37% 2.72% 2.33% 2.25% 2.02% 2.16% 2.13% 2.18% 2.02% 9.00% 8.58% 7.89% 6.20% 5.59% 5.70% 4.62%
5 2.18% 2.10% 2.25% 2.16% 1.96% 2.26% 2.26% 1.99% 2.14% 7.78% 8.23% 7.72% 7.23% 7.28% 6.41% 5.84%
6 2.22% 2.12% 2.26% 2.32% 1.89% 2.07% 2.03% 2.32% 2.23% 7.73% 7.37% 7.20% 6.30% 6.40% 5.89% 4.43%
7 2.07% 1.98% 1.97% 1.89% 1.80% 1.87% 2.02% 1.90% 1.66% 8.22% 7.38% 8.03% 6.82% 6.91% 5.92% 4.98%
8 1.95% 1.91% 1.99% 1.96% 1.87% 2.00% 1.81% 1.75% 1.75% 8.05% 7.52% 7.81% 7.60% 6.51% 5.34% 4.31%
9 1.98% 2.00% 1.94% 2.11% 2.02% 1.83% 1.75% 1.55% 1.52% 7.42% 7.43% 7.87% 8.53% 6.14% 4.35% 3.39%
Highest 1.51% 1.76% 1.96% 2.00% 3.46% 2.12% 1.58% 1.39% 1.19% 7.53% 6.68% 7.13% 10.99% 5.41% 2.87% 1.67%
Highest-Lowest -0.56% -0.30% 0.17% 0.34% 2.95% 1.46% 0.88% 0.72% 0.59% -2.80% -4.33% -3.29% 8.58% 3.72% 0.79% -0.48%
t-statistic -6.2 -3.4 1.9 3.9 34.4 19.6 12.5 10.5 8.7 -9.9 -16.5 -13.5 42.9 21.7 4.6 -2.6
Panel B: Investment by ranks of change in investor recognition 
Qtr t-4 Qtr t-3 Qtr t-2 Qtr t-1 Qtr t Qtr t+1 Qtr t+2 Qtr t+3 Qtr t+4 Year t-3 Year t-2 Year t-1 Year t Year t+1 Year t+2 Year t+3
Lowest 0.88% 0.86% 0.79% 0.75% 0.60% 0.52% 0.45% 0.40% 0.35% 4.54% 4.67% 4.23% 2.26% 0.88% 1.11% 1.48%
2 0.63% 0.56% 0.50% 0.45% 0.43% 0.32% 0.29% 0.28% 0.24% 3.48% 3.07% 2.39% 0.99% 0.36% 0.66% 1.18%
3 0.36% 0.37% 0.32% 0.22% 0.22% 0.13% 0.11% 0.06% 0.08% 2.62% 1.97% 1.61% 0.75% 0.32% 0.71% 0.88%
4 0.23% 0.27% 0.24% 0.22% 0.16% 0.20% 0.18% 0.21% 0.19% 1.65% 1.47% 1.10% 0.59% 0.25% 0.41% 0.50%
5 0.17% 0.13% 0.15% 0.12% 0.06% 0.06% 0.04% 0.02% 0.02% 1.63% 1.22% 1.18% 0.85% 0.66% 0.71% 0.74%
6 0.20% 0.22% 0.25% 0.21% 0.20% 0.14% 0.14% 0.13% 0.11% 1.95% 1.67% 1.54% 1.53% 1.33% 1.13% 1.17%
7 0.42% 0.37% 0.37% 0.38% 0.38% 0.37% 0.33% 0.27% 0.28% 2.55% 2.32% 2.05% 2.06% 1.81% 1.49% 1.52%
8 0.49% 0.51% 0.52% 0.51% 0.51% 0.50% 0.46% 0.42% 0.39% 3.29% 2.90% 2.91% 2.99% 2.61% 2.35% 2.10%
9 0.73% 0.71% 0.73% 0.74% 0.74% 0.76% 0.73% 0.70% 0.67% 3.75% 3.61% 3.56% 3.92% 3.81% 3.18% 2.88%
Highest 0.84% 0.87% 0.91% 0.93% 1.00% 1.04% 1.05% 1.00% 0.95% 4.59% 4.21% 4.12% 4.96% 5.14% 4.16% 3.53%
Highest-Lowest -0.05% 0.01% 0.13% 0.18% 0.40% 0.53% 0.60% 0.60% 0.60% 0.05% -0.46% -0.11% 2.70% 4.25% 3.05% 2.06%




Mean Quarterly Financing by Ranks of ∆BreadthQTR Mean Annual Financing by Ranks of ∆BreadthANN 
Averages of Financing and Investment Variables by Ranks of Change in Investor Recognition
Ranking of 
∆Breadth
Mean Quarterly Investment by Ranks of ∆BreadthQTR Mean Annual Investment by Ranks of ∆BreadthANN 
This table reports averages of financing (Panel A) and investment (Panel B) variables in quarters t-4 to t+4, and in years t-3 to t+3 by quarterly and annual decile rankings of ∆Breadth. Compustat data 
requirement reduced the sample size to 204,541 quarterly and 188,757 annual observations in Panel A and 210,931 quarterly and 186,156 annual observations in Panel B, for the period 1988-2004. 
Quarterly (annual) financing is measured as the quarterly (trailing-twelve-months) sum of Cash Flows from Financing Activities (Compustat data #113), scaled by average Total Assets (Compustat data
#44). Quarterly (annual) investment is calculated as the quarterly (trailing-twelve-months) sum of capital expenditure plus acquisitions, less depreciation and sales of property plant and equipment, scaled 
by average total assets (Compustat data item (90 + 94 - 77 - 83)/average 44). Percentage quarterly change in breadth (∆BreadthQTR) equals the difference in the number of institutions (13F filers) holding 
the firm's stock at the beginning and at the end of the quarter divided by the total number of institutions at the beginning of the quarter and multiplied by 100.  Percentage annual change in breadth
(∆BreadthANN) equals the difference in the number of institutions holding the firm's stock at the end of quarter t-4 and at the end of the current quarter divided by the total number of institutions at the end
of quarter t-4, and multiplied by 100. 
